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TOO BIG AND UNABLE TO FAIL
Stephen J. Lubben* & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.**
Abstract
Financial regulation after the Dodd-Frank Act has produced a blizzard
of acronyms, many of which revolve around the “too big to fail” (TBTF)
problem. OLA, OLF, SPOE, and TLAC are new regulatory tools that
seek to build a new regime for resolving failures of systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs). The explicit goal of this new
regime is to enable a SIFI to fail, just like United Airlines or Blockbuster
Video, without requiring a government bailout. This Article expresses
significant doubts about the new regime’s ability to work as advertised.
The “single point of entry” (SPOE) resolution strategy, which focuses all
resolution efforts on a SIFI’s parent holding company, is a strategy
devised for a very stylized, even hypothetical sort of failure that does not
threaten the stability of the financial system. It is unlikely to work as
intended during a future global crisis that involves multiple failing SIFIs
operating thousands of subsidiaries across dozens of national boundaries.
The Federal Reserve’s “total loss-absorbing capacity” (TLAC) rule is
closely tied to SPOE. It would require parent holding companies of SIFIs
to issue large amounts of debt securities that can be written off or
converted into equity in a resolution proceeding. However, TLAC debt
will create a new, more opaque way to impose the costs of resolving
failed SIFIs on ordinary citizens, because most TLAC debtholders are
likely to be retail investors in brokerage accounts, mutual funds, and
pension funds.
The most fundamental shortcoming of SPOE and TLAC, as currently
conceived, is that both policies would entrench the existing perverse
system for regulating SIFIs. The current regulatory system enables SIFIs
and their Wall Street creditors to reap massive benefits from the TBTF
subsidy while imposing the costs of that subsidy on ordinary citizens. We
recognize that a new and improved version of Dodd-Frank is unlikely to
emerge from Congress in the near term. However, regulators should use
their existing powers to shrink the TBTF subsidy by forcing SIFIs and
their Wall Street creditors to internalize at least some of the costs of the
enormous risks they create. The final Part of this Article proposes reforms
that would help to achieve that goal.
* Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics, Seton
Hall University School of Law.
** Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I would like to thank
my former students, Kevin Park and Ariel Stevenson, and Germaine Leahy, Head of Reference
for the Jacob Burns Law Library, for their excellent research assistance. Unless otherwise
indicated, this Article includes developments through February 28, 2017.
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INTRODUCTION
The heart of 2010’s Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)1 is the hope of ending TBTF. Since the
most important American financial institutions remain very large, DoddFrank’s long-term success necessarily turns on the ability of those
financial institutions to fail. Failing without disrupting the broader
economy, and thus requiring taxpayer assistance, is the key objective.2
To further this central aim, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) recently
adopted a new TLAC requirement.3 The Fed’s new TLAC mandate,
which will take effect on January 1, 2019, is intended to “strengthen the
ability of government authorities to resolve in an orderly way the largest
domestic and foreign banks operating in the United States without any
support from taxpayer-provided capital.”4
The Fed’s TLAC rule is closely tied to a proposed strategy for
handling financial institution failure—or “resolution,” in the industry
argot—known as “single point of entry.”5 SPOE goes hand in hand with
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code).
2. See id. (preamble) (stating that Dodd-Frank is intended “to end ‘too big to fail,’ [and]
to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”).
3. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Adopts Final Rule to Strengthen the Ability of Government Authorities to Resolve in Orderly
Way Largest Domestic and Foreign Banks Operating in the United States (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20161215a.htm.
4. Id.
5. See Dan Weiss et al., PwC Discusses Resolution: Single Point of Entry Strategy
Ascends, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 27, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/08/27/
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TLAC. SPOE cannot work without TLAC, and there is no reason to
impose TLAC on financial institutions without SPOE.
This Article argues that TLAC is just a new, more opaque way to
impose the cost of financial distress in oversized financial institutions on
ordinary citizens. Moreover, SPOE is a resolution tool designed for a very
stylized, even hypothetical sort of failure. We agree with other
commentators who have noted that SPOE’s strategy for resolving the
failure of large SIFIs depends on a number of unrealistic assumptions
and, therefore, is unlikely to work in actual practice.6
Title II of Dodd-Frank establishes the Orderly Liquidation Authority
(OLA), which empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver for failed
SIFIs.7 Title II requires the FDIC to liquidate failed SIFIs and to impose
any resulting losses on their shareholders and creditors.8 Section 214(a)
of Dodd-Frank declares: “All financial companies put into receivership
under [Title II] shall be liquidated. No taxpayer funds shall be used to
prevent the liquidation of any financial company under [Title II].”9
The FDIC recognized Title II’s liquidation-only mandate in its early
rulemakings under Dodd-Frank.10 However, megabanks quickly realized
that a liquidation-only approach for resolving failed SIFIs would pose a
major threat to the survival of their TBTF subsidy and would also threaten
to impose losses on Wall Street creditors, including holders of
commercial paper, derivatives, and securities repurchase agreements
(repos).11 Accordingly, in 2011 megabanks and other Wall Street
interests proposed a very different approach for resolving failed SIFIs.12
This new approach, called “recapitalization-within-resolution,” created a
roadmap for resolving failed megabanks by using chapter 11-style
reorganizations instead of liquidations.13 Wall Street’s reorganization
pwc-discusses-resolution-single-point-of-entry-strategy-ascends/.
6. See., e.g., Paul L. Lee, Bankruptcy Alternatives to Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act–Part
I, 132 BANKING L.J. 437, 464–74 (2015) (noting the SPOE model is “premised on [a] number of
significant assumptions or preconditions” that are questionable); Paul H. Kupiec & Peter J.
Wallison, Can the “Single Point of Entry” Strategy Be Used to Recapitalize a Failing Bank? 4,
37 (Am. Enter. Inst., AEI Economic Working Paper No. 2014-08, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519229 (discussing the authors’ doubts about SPOE’s assumptions).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 5383. See Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy
Clause, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 319, 409 (2013).
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384(a)(1), 5386(2), (3), 5394(a).
9. Id. § 5394(a).
10. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Industry’s Plan for Resolving Failed
Megabanks Will Ensure Future Bailouts for Wall Street, 50 GA. L. REV. 43, 51–53 (2015)
(describing the FDIC’s rulemakings under Title II in 2010 and 2011).
11. See id. at 46–47, 76.
12. Id. at 53–54.
13. Id. at 53.
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plan helped to provide the conceptual foundation for the SPOE resolution
strategy.14
As described in Part I of this Article, the SPOE strategy would place
only the parent holding company of a failed megabank into an OLA
receivership and would impose losses only on the holding company’s
shareholders and debtholders. Under SPOE, the operating subsidiaries of
a failed SIFI (including depository banks, securities broker-dealers, swap
dealers, and insurance companies) would remain in business, and all of
the creditors of those subsidiaries (including Wall Street creditors) would
be fully protected.
The Fed’s new TLAC regulation applies to eight U.S. megabanks,
which are currently designated as global systemically important banks
(G-SIBs), as well as U.S. intermediate holding companies owned by
foreign G-SIBs.15 These, of course, are the very same institutions that are
most likely to be subject to OLA.
The Fed’s TLAC rule establishes and implements SPOE as the
preferred strategy for resolving failed U.S. megabanks.16 The TLAC rule
requires the parent holding company of each SIFI to maintain a minimum
level of Tier 1 shareholders’ equity and TLAC debt.17 If the parent
holding company is placed in an OLA receivership, the company’s
shareholders’ equity and TLAC debt would be used to help recapitalize
the SIFI’s operating subsidiaries.18

14. Id. at 53–54 (describing the development of Wall Street’s “recapitalization-withinresolution” plan for resolving failed SIFIs). Although the FDIC played an important role in
developing the SPOE concept, the FDIC has not yet formally endorsed SPOE as its preferred
strategy for resolving failed SIFIs under Title II of Dodd-Frank. See infra notes 51–65, 76–77 and
accompanying text (describing the FDIC’s participation in formulating the SPOE strategy and the
agency’s failure to give final approval to the strategy).
15. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations, 82 Fed. Reg.
8266, 8272 (Jan. 24, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252); see also Total Loss-Absorbing
Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company Requirements for Systemically
Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate Holding Companies of Systemically
Important Foreign Banking Organizations, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,926, 74,931 (proposed Nov. 30, 2015)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217, 252). The eight U.S. banking organizations currently
designated as G-SIBs are Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo. Total Loss-Absorbing
Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8272 n.35.
16. Id. at 8288–89.
17. Id. at 8290.
18. Id. at 8270.
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Adding TLAC debt to the capital structure of SIFIs would also
facilitate the use of SPOE in other resolution proceedings, including cases
filed under the Bankruptcy Code. Many of the so-called “chapter 14”
proposals, which would add a new, financial-institution-focused chapter
to the current Bankruptcy Code, are designed to facilitate a process that
looks very much like SPOE.
As shown below, a large percentage of TLAC debtholders will likely
be retail investors in brokerage accounts, mutual funds, and pension
funds, because federal regulators will strongly discourage financial
institutions from purchasing TLAC debt. Additionally, the SPOE strategy
will open up the possibility that non-bankrupt operating subsidiaries of a
financial holding company—the very subsidiaries that are most apt to
cause actual problems—will be eligible for either direct financial support
from the Fed or indirect assistance, funneled through the holding
company, in the form of a taxpayer-financed bridge loan from the
Treasury Department. Thus, SPOE and TLAC will impose most of the
costs of resolving failed megabanks on ordinary citizens, either as
investors or taxpayers, while giving 100% protection to Wall Street
creditors.
This Article contends that it is highly questionable whether SPOE and
TLAC will produce their promised benefits. It is far from clear whether
the parent holding company of a failed SIFI can be placed in an OLA
resolution without triggering contagious runs by the creditors of its
subsidiaries. It is also very doubtful whether host country regulators with
jurisdiction over a failed SIFI’s subsidiaries will cooperate when the
SIFI’s home country supervisor commences a resolution procedure for
the parent holding company. The SPOE resolution strategy would be
unworkable if host country officials decide to “ring fence” subsidiaries
or assets located within their jurisdictions.
SPOE also suffers from a problem that is well-known to bankruptcy
lawyers. In corporate bankruptcies, managers almost always want to do a
“prepack.”19 That is, corporate managers typically believe that their
19. As explained by Robert K. Rasmussen and Randall S. Thomas:
There are two general types of Chapter 11 proceeding initiated by large, publicly
held companies—prepackaged bankruptcies and traditional, full-blown Chapter
11 bankruptcies. A prepackaged bankruptcy hinges on agreement. The managers
of a firm in financial distress negotiate with the firm’s main creditors over a plan
of reorganization prior to the filing for bankruptcy. A bankruptcy petition is filed
only after agreement among the creditors has been reached on the new debt
structure. The benefit of a prepackaged bankruptcy, as opposed to an out-of-court
restructuring, is that it eliminates the holdout problem endemic in out-of-court
restructurings. Absent bankruptcy, debt holders cannot have their claims reduced
without their consent. This creates a collective action problem. When a firm
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firm’s financial problems can be solved by a quick trip through
bankruptcy that converts bondholders into shareholders. However,
financial distress is not always caused by balance sheet problems; indeed,
it is more often caused by operational problems.20
This is even more apt to be true in financial institutions, where
liquidity problems, with the accompanying threat of going-concern
insolvency, seem far more likely to occur than balance sheet insolvency.
In addition, the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Fed would
be likely to oppose transactions (whether voluntary acquisitions or
emergency resolutions) that look like leveraged buyouts of SIFIs and
increase the debt service burdens of the resulting institutions.
Moreover, any attempt to impose losses on a failed SIFI’s TLAC
debtholders will probably trigger widespread panic among investors
holding bail-in debt issued by other SIFIs that are believed to be
vulnerable. In February 2016, after regulators imposed losses on
bondholders in failed Italian and Portuguese banks, a major selloff
occurred in the market for contingent convertible bonds (CoCos)—a form
of bail-in debt—issued by European banks.21 That selloff creates
substantial doubts about the ability of regulators to bail in TLAC debt
without disrupting financial markets.
Part I begins with an overview of TLAC and SPOE and their
symbiotic relationship. The Fed has declared that TLAC “is primarily
focused on implementing the SPOE resolution strategy” for failed
megabanks.22 In the Fed’s view, SPOE offers “substantial advantages”
because it would fully protect the creditors of subsidiaries of a failed
megabank and would thereby allow those subsidiaries “to continue
normal operations.”23 In addition, by preventing any failure of the
needs to alter its capital structure, individual creditors may opt not to participate
in a restructuring that benefits the creditors as a whole. They hope that, although
they refuse to reduce their own claims, other creditors will reduce theirs.
Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate
Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 288 (2001).
20. Stephen H. Case & Mitchell A. Harwood, Current Issues in Prepackaged Chapter 11
Plans of Reorganization and Using the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for Instant
Reorganizations, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 75, 88–91.
21. See Robert W. Greene, Understanding CoCos: What Operational Concerns & Global
Trends Mean for U.S. Policymakers 33 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus.
& Gov’t, Working Paper No. 62, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2913094.
22. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations, 80 Fed. Reg.
74,928 (proposed Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217, 252).
23. Id.; see also Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8270 n.29 (confirming that
the Fed favors SPOE because it “could avoid losses to the third-party creditors of [a failed

2017]

TOO BIG AND UNABLE TO FAIL

1211

subsidiaries, SPOE would “avoid the need for separate proceedings for
separate legal entities run by separate authorities across multiple
jurisdictions.”24
Part II explains the key problems with TLAC and SPOE. It argues that
SPOE is an unrealistic strategy for resolving failed SIFIs, and that SPOE
and TLAC in combination will probably impose losses on the very
taxpayers that Dodd-Frank purports to protect.
The example of Lehman Brothers’s failure illustrates serious
questions about the ability of SPOE and TLAC to prevent the collapse of
a SIFI. This Article concludes that SPOE is ill suited to address the very
kind of failure that gave rise to OLA’s creation. Lehman’s value was the
value of its broker–dealer operations, broadly defined. In the midst of
market-wide skepticism about the value of key assets held by Lehman’s
corporate group, imposing “haircuts” on holding company creditors
would have done little to strengthen Lehman or stop the panic. Lehman
Holdings could have survived only with the infusion of government
funding sufficient to enable the company to survive the market
disruption. Providing such funding would have looked very much like the
type of bailout that Dodd-Frank has foresworn.
Part II also identifies serious flaws in the various chapter 14
bankruptcy reform proposals, which are closely tied to the use of SPOE.
The shortcomings of SPOE are central to this Article’s claim that the
proposed chapter 14 bills are of very limited utility. While chapter 11 has
a long and storied history of success in reorganizing major corporations
like Texaco, Pacific Gas and Electric, and most major airlines in this
country, the proposed chapter 14 is something of a one-trick pony. In
contrast to chapter 11, which is noted for its flexibility, chapter 14 would
not work in any circumstance beyond a “holding company only” or
SPOE-style case.
For the same reasons that SPOE in OLA is unlikely to be of much use,
chapter 14 as currently proposed will also be of little use. Indeed, the
financial industry’s eager embrace of chapter 14 more likely stems from
the industry’s hope that a new chapter 14 would enable the Fed to provide
financial assistance to the operating subsidiaries (and thus Wall Street
creditors) under terms that would be more generous than the provisions
of OLA as applied by the FDIC.
Part III of this Article considers potential ways to improve SPOE,
TLAC, and chapter 14. First, regulators should require SIFIs to provide a
host of detailed disclosures when they sell TLAC debt to investors. Those
disclosures should include a description of the subsidy that TLAC
bondholders are providing to operating company creditors, and it should
megabank’s] subsidiaries and could thereby allow the subsidiaries to continue normal
operations”).
24. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8270.
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clarify that TLAC bondholders will be deeply subordinated within the
capital structure of the overall corporate group. “Structural
subordination” is a phrase that must be clearly explained to these
bondholders. Our proposed disclosures would help to ensure that TLAC
bonds pay higher interest rates that reflect the extraordinary risks inherent
in bail-in debt. If higher interest rates encourage SIFIs to satisfy more of
their TLAC mandates by issuing equity capital rather than bail-in debt,
that would be a highly desirable result.
Second, regulators should strengthen TLAC to make it viable in a
world where SPOE might not work. In particular, the new TLAC
requirements should be developed to make OLA work in a world where
liquidity problems are likely to be the source of most systemic crises.
Achieving this goal will require either a prefunded Orderly Liquidation
Fund (OLF) or a self-funded resolution reserve held by each financial
holding company. Neither approach is likely to be popular with the
management of SIFIs, but no other solution is likely to ensure that the
necessary liquidity will be available (without government bailouts) in
times of crisis.
Part III briefly sketches the elements of a more viable chapter 14,
which would allow for the use of “normal” bankruptcy style procedures
when possible. But Part III also resists baking the choice of resolution
mechanisms into the statute: flexibility is one of chapter 11’s key
attributes, and so it should be for chapter 14.
The most fundamental shortcoming of SPOE and TLAC, as currently
conceived, is that both policies would entrench the current perverse
system for regulating SIFIs. Because an improved version of DoddFrank, with stronger controls over SIFIs, is unlikely to be proposed by
the Trump Administration or to be passed by Congress, regulators should
use available tools to shrink the TBTF subsidy by forcing SIFIs and their
Wall Street creditors to internalize at least some of the costs of the
enormous risks they create. Part III proposes reforms that would help to
achieve that goal.
I. SPOE AND TLAC
Dodd-Frank’s OLA burst onto the scene as a kind of Frankenstein’s
monster, with bits of the Bankruptcy Code, the Securities Investor
Protection Act, and bank receivership law glued together to create an
insolvency system for financial companies.25
25. Stephen J. Lubben & Sarah Pei Woo, Reconceptualizing Lehman, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J.
297, 325 (2014). See Jamieson L. Hardee, The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor’s
Perspective, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 259, 275 (2011); Thomas W. Joo, A Comparison of
Liquidation Regimes: Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority and the Securities Investor
Protection Act, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 47, 47 (2011).
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It seemed doubtful whether this new creation would actually work—
how could the FDIC possibly run a massive corporate bankruptcy case
all by itself, with a resolution tool that was obviously incomplete in
several respects? It seemed that OLA was designed to answer a regulatory
challenge and nothing more: We had no choice but to let Lehman fail,
and rescue AIG—we just didn’t have the tools we needed to resolve them
like we do banks. Give us those tools, and we swear, all your problems
will go away.26
Then came SPOE, which sought to make the use of OLA credible.27
The idea was simple: only the holding company would go into an OLA
receivership, while all of its operating subsidiaries would continue to
conduct business as usual.28
SPOE seeks to avoid the essential problem that, while there is no such
thing as a SIFI without cross-border operations, OLA as drafted has an
even narrower domestic focus than the Bankruptcy Code.29 As further
discussed below, SPOE is designed to solve cross-border resolution
problems by limiting a SIFI’s resolution to a single proceeding
administered by the home country supervisor of the SIFI’s parent holding
company.30 In addition, SPOE would enable the FDIC to avoid the
supervisory burden of overseeing the operation of multiple subsidiaries
of a failed SIFI.31 Instead, the FDIC would simply manage the resolution
of the parent holding company.32

26. Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 857,
911 (2014); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 993 (2011) (explaining that the
OLA seeks to provide a viable alternative to the choice that federal regulators faced during the
financial crisis of either arranging a bailout or allowing a disorderly bankruptcy).
27. John Crawford, “Single Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the Latest Cure for
Bailouts, 109 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE 103, 106–07 (2014), http://www.northwestern
lawreview.org/online/%E2%80%9Csingle-point-entry%E2%80%9D-promise-and-limits-latestcure-bailouts; Lee, supra note 6, at 461–74.
28. See, e.g., Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point
of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, 76,616, 76,723 (Dec. 18, 2013) (stating that, under SPOE,
subsidiaries of the holding company would remain open for business while the parent holding
company is resolved in an OLA receivership); see also Michael Krimminger et al., FDIC and
Bank of England Signal Significant Cooperation on Resolution Issues in Joint Paper Describing
“Single Point of Entry” Resolution of a Cross-Border SIFI, 130 BANKING L.J. 328, 329 (2013)
(describing the Joint Paper for SPOE developed by the FDIC and the Bank of England).
29. Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in
International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 1104–05 (2012).
30. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bank Resolution in the European Banking
Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1327
(2015).
31. Id. at 1300.
32. Id.
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For example, imagine the following financial holding company,
which we will assume is systemically important, despite the simplicity of
its organizational structure:

HoldCo
Bond debt
Publicly traded equity

BankCo
Intercompany debt held by HoldCo
Operating debt
Equity held by HoldCo

Under the SPOE approach, HoldCo cancels its bond debt and also
cancels its intercompany debt with BankCo.33 That debt cancellation
solves routine balance sheet insolvency issues at both companies.34 Thus,
SPOE’s supporters argue that the SPOE strategy will work as long as
HoldCo is required to issue a sufficiently large amount of bail-in debt,
which can then be cancelled or converted into equity when HoldCo is
placed in an OLA receivership.35
The Fed’s TLAC rule seeks to ensure that parent holding companies
of SIFIs will hold enough bail-in debt.36 But before investigating TLAC,
this Article first examines SPOE in greater detail.

33.
34.
35.
36.

It also cancels its old equity and gives new equity to old creditors.
Gordon & Ringe, supra note 30, at 1299–300.
See id. at 1353–54.
See id. at 1352.
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A. SPOE
Dodd-Frank’s OLA applies to “covered financial companies,” which
are defined to exclude depository banks.37 Other types of financial
institutions, including financial holding companies, become covered
financial companies if they are placed in receivership pursuant to OLA’s
required procedures as specified in § 203 of Dodd-Frank.38
A financial company can be placed in an OLA receivership if the
Treasury Secretary satisfies a two-part test.39 First, the Secretary must
determine whether the financial company is in default, or in danger of
default.40 This would include a financial company in bankruptcy or near
bankruptcy, or otherwise likely to be insolvent.41
Second, the Treasury Secretary must determine whether the collapse
of the financial institution, or its resolution outside OLA, would be likely
to have “serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United
States.”42 If the Treasury Secretary answers both questions in the
affirmative (after receiving supporting recommendations from the Fed
and the FDIC), the Treasury Secretary will appoint the FDIC as receiver
and the FDIC will take control of the assets, obligations, and operations
of the financial company.43
Under OLA, the FDIC can take control of any type of financial
company, except for FDIC-insured depository institutions and insurance
companies.44 FDIC-insured depository institutions must be resolved
under the FDIC’s preexisting bank receivership process, and insurance
companies must be resolved under the applicable state insurance
company receivership process. The FDIC is permitted to commence a
state insurance receivership, and the FDIC will oversee virtually all bank
receiverships.45
37. 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(8) (2012); see also id. § 5381(a)(11)(B)(iv) (“The term ‘financial
company’ means any company . . . [and] any subsidiary of any company . . . (other than a
subsidiary that is an insured depository institution or an insurance company) . . . .”).
38. Id. § 5383. “Financial companies” are defined as those companies that receive at least
85% of their consolidated revenues from finance, and for this definition the revenues of a
subsidiary depository bank are included. Id. § 5381(b).
39. Chrystin Ondersma, Shadow Banking and Financial Distress: The Treatment of
"Money-Claims" in Bankruptcy, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 79, 134–35.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(1).
41. Id. § 5383(b)(1), (c)(4).
42. Id. § 5383(b)(2).
43. Id. § 5383.
44. Id. § 5381(a)(11)(B)(iv).
45. See id. (specifying that an FDIC-insured depository institution or insurance company is
not a “financial company” that can be placed in an OLA receivership). The FDIC has authority to
act as the receiver for any FDIC-insured bank that fails, whether it is chartered under federal or
state law. Id. § 1821(c). The only banks that would not be placed in an FDIC receivership are
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Broker-dealers are subject to being separated between “good”
brokers, which the FDIC takes charge of, and “bad” brokers, which are
liquidated by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).46
Thus, under OLA, the FDIC will gain control over most, but not all,
of the subsidiaries of a large financial holding company.47 For example,
Bank of America, which includes insurance companies, broker-dealers
(notably Merrill Lynch), and several depository banks operating under
the Bank of America brand, would see the bulk of its broker-dealers
pulled into OLA, while the depository banks would be turned over to the
FDIC as bank receiver (and thus subject to different statutory
instructions), and other entities would be farmed out to state insurance
receiverships and some bits perhaps given to SIPC.48
In addition, OLA is by its terms limited to domestically incorporated
entitles,49 while the Bankruptcy Code is broad enough to allow for the
reorganization of a foreign firm.50 Thus, OLA intentionally slices off the
foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of a financial institution that have been
placed into an OLA receivership.
OLA thus applies only to the domestic core of the financial holding
company. That limitation, combined with doubts about the FDIC’s ability
to manage the diverse assets that it might acquire as receiver of this core,
has led to legitimate doubts about the practical workability of OLA.
The FDIC initially sought to address concerns about the feasibility of
OLA by developing the SPOE concept.51 Under SPOE, only the holding
company, and not its subsidiaries, would be placed in an OLA

those relatively few banks that are not FDIC-insured. Uninsured state banks would be governed
by state bank receivership law, and uninsured national banks would be subject to a recentlyadopted receivership regime promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
federal regulator of national banks. Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, 81 Fed. Reg.
92,594, 92,595 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 51) (noting the existence of only
fifty-two uninsured national banks, all of which were national trust banks).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 5385.
47. Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority:
Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 192 (2014).
48. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA,
81 U. CIN. L. REV. 485, 485 (2012) (evaluating alternative approaches for handling the insolvency,
bankruptcy, or “resolution” of large, complex financial institutions, in light of lessons learned
from the collapse of Lehman Brothers, by examining the legal and financial structure of Bank of
America).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(11)(A); see id. § 5381(a)(8).
50. See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Bankruptcy Tourists, 70 BUS.
LAW. 719, 721 (2015).
51. Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, FDIC, Remarks at the Bank Structure
Conference (May 10, 2012), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2012/spmay
1012.html.
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receivership.52 Operating subsidiaries would, in theory at least, continue
to operate as if nothing was wrong with their parent company.53
In a May 2012 speech, FDIC Chairman Martin Gruenberg described
SPOE as “the most promising resolution strategy” for dealing with a
SIFI’s failure.54 Mr. Gruenberg explained that SPOE would “place the
parent [holding] company into receivership and pass its assets, principally
investments in its subsidiaries, to a newly created bridge holding
company. This will allow subsidiaries . . . to remain open and avoid the
disruption that would likely accompany their closings.”55
In December 2012, the FDIC and the Bank of England (BoE) jointly
identified SPOE as a desirable approach for resolving failures of global
SIFIs.56 The FDIC and BoE agreed that SPOE would work well for global
SIFIs because, “[b]y taking control of the SIFI at the top of the group,
subsidiaries (domestic and foreign) carrying out critical services can
remain open and operating, limiting the need for destabilizing insolvency
proceedings at the subsidiary level.”57 The FDIC and BoE also agreed
that SPOE could reduce cross-border complications by enabling the home
country supervisor of a failed SIFI to control the resolution process at the
“holding company level” while avoiding “foreign insolvency
proceedings” for subsidiaries located in other countries.58
While the FDIC and BoE supported the SPOE concept, they indicated
that the final outcome of an SPOE resolution would still be a liquidation
of the failed SIFI.59 The agencies stated that SPOE’s “top-down
resolution” would be followed by “significant restructuring” that could
include “shrinking the [SIFI’s] balance sheet, breaking the company up
into smaller entities, and/or selling or closing certain operations.”60
In December 2013, the FDIC presented a detailed SPOE proposal and
invited the public to comment on that proposal.61 The FDIC’s proposal
stated that an SPOE resolution would put a failed SIFI’s parent holding
company into an OLA receivership and would transfer its operating
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Lee, supra note 6, at 464–66 (discussing the FDIC’s early development of
the SPOE concept).
56. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BANK OF ENGLAND, RESOLVING GLOBALLY ACTIVE,
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ii (2012), https://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/
2012/gsifi.pdf.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id. at 6–7.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (Dec. 18, 2013).
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subsidiaries to a newly-formed bridge financial company (BFC).62 The
FDIC would then wipe out the equity interests of the SIFI’s shareholders
and convert the claims of the SIFI’s long-term debtholders into equity
interests in the BFC.63 The failed SIFI’s subsidiaries (including banks,
securities broker-dealers, swap dealers, and insurance companies) would
continue to operate without interruption under the BFC’s control, and the
rights of creditors of those subsidiaries would not be impaired.64
After completing an SPOE resolution, the FDIC would approve a
“restructuring” plan to transfer the operating subsidiaries from the BFC
to one or more successor companies. According to the FDIC’s proposal,
the restructuring plan “might result in the [BFC] being divided into
several companies or parts of entities sold to third parties,” and “the
[BFC] might become smaller and less complex.”65 The proposal’s
repeated use of the word “might,” rather than “will,” when discussing
restructuring options, suggested a possible weakening of the FDIC’s
commitment to a liquidation-only approach.
Five major financial industry trade associations enthusiastically
endorsed the FDIC’s SPOE proposal.66 The same groups also rejected
criticism of the proposal by former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker.67 Mr.
Volcker observed that SPOE looks “more like a reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code than a liquidation as required by Title
II [of Dodd-Frank].”68 Others agreed with Mr. Volcker’s view that the
SPOE strategy appeared to be incompatible with Title II’s liquidationonly mandate.69
62. Id. at 76,615–16.
63. Id. at 76,616.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 76,620 (emphasis added).
66. See Letter from The Clearing House, the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, the Am.
Bankers Ass’n, the Fin. Servs. Roundtable, and the Glob. Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to FDIC (Feb.
18, 2014), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/media/Files/Association%20Documents/201402
18%20Single%20Point%20of%20Entry%20Comment%20Letter.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Wall
Street SPOE Letter].
67. Id. at 25.
68. Id.; see also id. at 25 n.90 (citing Mr. Volcker’s remarks); Joe Adler, Is the FDIC’s
‘Single Point’ Resolution Plan a Stealth Bailout?, AM. BANKER, (Dec. 13, 2013), 2013 WLNR
31174108 (citing Mr. Volcker’s remarks).
69. See Adler, supra note 68 (quoting Arthur Wilmarth’s opinion that SPOE “doesn’t look
like a liquidation” and instead “looks like a . . . reorganization in which the [failed SIFI] survives
to fight another day”); Who Is Too Big to Fail: Does Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act Enshrine
Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 130th Cong. 7 (2013) (written statement of David A. Skeel, Jr., Professor
of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (“[A]lthough Title II explicitly requires that its
provisions be used for liquidation, [SPOE] is essentially a reorganization. It thus stands in tension
with the explicit requirements of Title II.”); see also Joe Adler, How the FDIC Can Fix Its Big
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The financial industry trade groups asserted that Title II would
accommodate an SPOE strategy that “treats claimants as consistently as
possible with how they would have been treated in a successful
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code.”70 In fact, however, as the
groups acknowledged, Title II only requires that creditors receive “at
least as much value in satisfaction of their claims as they would have
received in a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.”71 To
bolster their argument that Title II would allow reorganizations of failed
SIFIs, the Wall Street groups claimed that dissolving a failed SIFI’s
parent holding company would be sufficient to satisfy Title II’s
liquidation-only mandate.72 They also maintained that Title II does not
require any restructuring of subsidiaries after they are transferred to a
BFC.73 Other Wall Street supporters agreed that Title II would allow a
BFC and its subsidiaries to emerge intact as a new financial holding
company following an SPOE resolution.74
Thus, Wall Street’s version of SPOE contemplates little or no
restructuring at either the holding company level or the subsidiary level
after the FDIC transfers operating subsidiaries from a failed SIFI’s parent
holding company to a BFC. Wall Street obviously prefers a
reorganization strategy that would convert a failed SIFI into a new,
Bank Resolution Plan, AM. BANKER (Feb. 24, 2014), 2014 WLNR 4869133 (quoting letter dated
Feb. 18, 2014, from former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, who warned that, “without further
progress under Title I [of Dodd-Frank] to require U.S. SIFIs to simplify and rationalize their legal
structures, the most likely outcome of the SPOE approach will be to replace one systemic firm
with another. . . . [T]his new firm . . . could still have the same name, many of the same employees,
and pose the same external risks to the system”).
70. 2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter, supra note 66, at 26 (emphasis added). The trade groups
did not cite any provision of Title II that explicitly mandates treatment for creditors similar to a
reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. However, the groups asserted that a
“duty” to provide such treatment could be “implied” from Title II’s overall purpose to “avoid or
mitigate” the potential for “serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United States.” Id.
at 26 n.97.
71. Id. at 26 (emphasis added in part) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(7)(B), (d)(2)(B)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 25, 27.
74. See JOHN F. BOVENZI ET AL., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., TOO BIG TO FAIL: A REPORT OF
THE FAILURE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM INITIATIVE OF
THE BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 31 (2013), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/too-big-fail-pathsolution-525/ [hereinafter 2013 BPC SPOE Report]; see also id. at 30 fig.7 (showing graphically
how the BFC would be converted into a new financial holding company). The principal authors
of the 2013 BPC SPOE Report were John Bovenzi (a partner in the Oliver Wyman financial
consulting firm), Randall Guynn (head of Davis Polk’s financial institutions practice and
originator of the “recapitalization-within-resolution” concept), and Thomas Jackson (a leading
bankruptcy law scholar). Id. at 82. The Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) is a think tank that receives
significant funding from major financial institutions and financial trade groups, and BPC
generally supports policies favorable to Wall Street. Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 59 n.62.
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cleaned-up, and recapitalized SIFI with a minimum of structural changes.
During the recapitalization, as indicated above, the SIFI’s subsidiaries
would remain in operation and all of their creditors (including Wall Street
creditors) would be fully protected from losses.75
The FDIC has not formally approved the SPOE proposal it issued in
December 2013. In addition, the FDIC may not necessarily agree with
Wall Street’s version of SPOE, which embraces a chapter 11-style
reorganization strategy. FDIC’s Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig
expressed serious reservations when the FDIC released its SPOE
proposal, and he noted that the FDIC “has not adopted [the SPOE]
strategy” in a speech given in January 2016.76 Similarly, in a speech
delivered in September 2015, FDIC Chairman Gruenberg explained that
Title II of Dodd-Frank gives the FDIC the necessary authority for
“breaking up and winding down” a failed SIFI, and he “would expect
some business lines or subsidiaries (such as broker-dealers) to quickly
shrink and wind down and for others to be sold off” during an OLA
resolution. Chairman Gruenberg further stated, “An explicit objective is
to ensure that no systemically significant entity emerges from this
process.”77 Thus, Chairman Gruenberg’s speech did not endorse Wall
Street’s efforts to promote an SPOE resolution process that would operate
as the functional equivalent of a chapter 11 reorganization.
Nonetheless, there is obvious tension between the recent remarks of
Chairman Gruenberg and Vice Chairman Hoenig and the FDIC’s
repeated statements that ownership of the failed SIFI would be quickly
returned to private control by distributing the equity of the new holding
company to creditors. The FDIC’s ability to compel any sort of breakup
of the SIFI would presumably decline markedly once it no longer
controlled the holding company. Moreover, as the next Section explains,
the Fed has enthusiastically embraced the SPOE resolution strategy and
does not appear to share any of the doubts that the FDIC may have about
Wall Street’s chapter 11-style version of SPOE.

75. 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 74, at 26–32.
76. Joe Adler, Likely Battle Ahead for FDIC’s ‘Single Point’ Resolution Plan, AM. BANKER,
(Dec. 11, 2013), 2013 WLNR 30941803 (reporting on Mr. Hoenig’s critical comments when the
FDIC released its SPOE proposal); Thomas Hoenig, Vice Chairman, FDIC, Remarks at the
Peterson Institute for International Economics: The Relative Role of Debt in Bank Resiliency and
Resolvability, (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spjan2016.html
[hereinafter Hoenig 2016 Speech].
77. Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, FDIC, Remarks to the FDIC Banking Research
Conference (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spsep1715.html.
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B. TLAC
The Fed’s TLAC rule is clearly designed to entrench SPOE as the
preferred strategy for resolving failures of SIFIs. The Fed’s TLAC rule
accords with Wall Street’s desire to maintain a continuity of existence for
the operating subsidiaries of a failed G-SIB and to provide full protection
for the subsidiaries’ creditors.78 The Fed prefers the SPOE strategy over
the alternative “multiple point of entry” (MPOE) resolution approach.
Unlike SPOE, MPOE would require “separate resolutions of different
legal entities within the financial firm and could potentially be executed
by multiple resolution authorities across multiple jurisdictions,” a result
the Fed plainly does not want.79
When it takes effect on January 1, 2019, the Fed’s TLAC rule will
require the parent holding company of each U.S. G-SIB to maintain
“eligible external TLAC” equal to 18% of its risk-weighted assets
(RWAs) or 7.5% of its total leverage exposure, whichever is greater. 80 In
addition, each U.S. G-SIB will be obliged to maintain supplemental
“external TLAC buffers” equal to 2.5% of RWAs and 2% of its total
leverage exposure.81 If a U.S. G-SIB fails to maintain both required
buffers, its ability to make capital distributions (including stock buybacks
and dividends) and to pay discretionary bonuses will be restricted.82
In addition to creating “external TLAC” requirements for U.S. GSIBs, the Fed’s TLAC rule will require each U.S. intermediate holding
company owned by a foreign G-SIB to satisfy a separate “internal TLAC”
requirement. This “internal TLAC” requirement will oblige each U.S.
intermediate holding company to sell qualifying TLAC instruments to its
parent foreign G-SIB (or, in certain cases, to third-party investors). The
“internal TLAC” mandate is designed to enable the failure of a U.S.
intermediate holding company to be resolved by writing off the TLAC
investments held by its parent foreign G-SIB (or, in certain cases, by
third-party investors).83
78. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations, 82 Fed. Reg.
8266, 8279–80, 8298–301 (Jan. 24, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252).
79. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations, 80 Fed. Reg.
74,926, 74,928 (proposed Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217, 252); see Total
Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8270 n.29.
80. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8272–73.
81. Id. at 8276–77.
82. Id. at 8272–78.
83. A U.S. intermediate holding company must issue qualifying TLAC instruments to its
parent foreign G-SIB (or to its directly or indirectly wholly-owned subsidiary), if the failure of
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Under the Fed’s TLAC rule, each parent holding company of a U.S.
G-SIB will be required to maintain qualifying TLAC that includes a
combination of Tier 1 capital (common stock and non-cumulative
perpetual preferred stock) and “eligible external long-term debt” (TLAC
debt).84 In satisfying its total TLAC requirement, each G-SIB must
maintain a minimum ratio of TLAC debt equal to 6% of its RWAs plus
its G-SIB surcharge or 4.5% of its leverage exposure, whichever is
greater.85
Each parent holding company of a G-SIB will be required to issue
TLAC debt directly, instead of through subsidiaries, thereby ensuring that
the TLAC debt can be written off in an SPOE resolution of the holding
company. As the Fed’s proposal explains,
Under the SPOE approach, only the [holding company]
would enter resolution. The [holding company’s] eligible
[TLAC debt] would be used to absorb losses incurred
throughout the banking organization, enabling the
recapitalization of operating subsidiaries that had incurred
losses and enabling those subsidiaries to continue operating
on a going-concern basis.86
Thus, TLAC debt will function as bail-in debt and will be used to
recapitalize the failed G-SIB’s operating subsidiaries.
Under the Fed’s rule, TLAC debt must be unsecured, must not be
guaranteed by a G-SIB’s holding company or any of its subsidiaries, and
must not have any credit enhancements that would increase its seniority.87
TLAC debt must have a remaining maturity of at least one year and will
be subject to a 50% haircut if its remaining maturity is less than two
years.88 TLAC debt must be “plain-vanilla” debt that does not include
“[e]xotic features” (such as embedded derivatives), must be governed by
the foreign parent would be resolved under the SPOE strategy. Under the SPOE approach, the
U.S. intermediate holding company would continue in operation and would not be placed in
resolution. In contrast, a U.S. intermediate holding company would be allowed to issue TLAC
instruments to third-party investors if the failure of the parent foreign G-SIB would be resolved
under an MPOE strategy. Under the MPOE resolution approach, the parent foreign G-SIB’s
failure might trigger a separate resolution proceeding for the U.S. intermediate holding company.
Id. at 8270–71, 8287–89. The remainder of this Article will focus on the proposed “external
TLAC” rules for U.S. G-SIBs and will not address the “internal TLAC” requirement for
intermediate U.S. holding companies owned by foreign G-SIBs.
84. Id. at 8270.
85. Id. at 8272–75; see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.400–.406 (2016) (prescribing requirements
for calculating the G-SIB capital surcharge applicable to each U.S. G-SIB).
86. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8279.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 8278.
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U.S. law, and must not be convertible into equity prior to the date of the
FDIC’s appointment as receiver for the holding company.89
To ensure that parent holding companies of G-SIBs will be less
difficult to resolve, the Fed’s TLAC rule includes “clean holding
company” provisions.90 Those provisions will prohibit each parent
holding company of a G-SIB from entering into a number of transactions,
including (i) issuing non-TLAC liabilities unless they have a status senior
to TLAC debt, (ii) issuing non-TLAC liabilities that exceed 5% of the
holding company’s total TLAC, (iii) issuing any type of debt to nonaffiliates with an original maturity of less than one year, or (iv) entering
into any “qualifying financial contracts” (e.g., derivatives or repos) with
non-affiliates.91 The “clean holding company” provisions will prevent GSIB holding companies from issuing short-term liabilities or volatile
exposures that would be subject to “the risk of destabilizing funding runs”
by third-party creditors.92
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SPOE–TLAC REGIME
This Part discusses several reasons for questioning the workability of
the SPOE–TLAC regime. It begins by focusing on the concerns with
SPOE and TLAC individually, and then turns to the concerns that arise
from the joint operation of TLAC and SPOE. It concludes with some
observations about the financial industry’s problematic efforts to create a
new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, typically designated chapter 14,
which would allow for SPOE to be used outside of OLA.
A. SPOE, Will It Work?
This basic SPOE approach—placing the top-level holding company
and nothing else into resolution—is not a new idea. Indeed, it is the initial
favored approach for most corporate chapter 11 cases. However, reality
often intrudes in chapter 11, and much of the corporate group frequently
is compelled to file for bankruptcy.
The reasons begin with the capital structure of most corporate groups.
First, lenders, especially senior lenders, often obtain guarantees from the

89. Id. at 8278–84. The TLAC rule includes a “grandfathering provision,” which will allow
U.S. G-SIBs to include long-term debt that would not otherwise satisfy the standards for TLAC
debt, if that long-term debt was issued prior to December 31, 2016, and meets certain criteria. Id.
at 8278–79.
90. Id. at 8266.
91. Id. at 8298.
92. Id. at 8298–302. The 5% limit on non-TLAC liabilities will not apply if all TLAC debt
issued by the G-SIB’s parent holding company is contractually subordinated to the company’s
other liabilities. Id. at 8283–301.
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operating subsidiaries.93 Second, many lending agreements contain crossdefault provisions and acceleration clauses, meaning that a bankruptcy
filing by the parent company will automatically generate problems for its
subsidiaries, even if the subsidiaries are otherwise solvent.94
Federal regulators are not unaware of these issues, and have tried to
adopt regulatory solutions that will buttress SPOE. For example, under
intense regulatory pressure, the largest American financial institutions
have agreed to amend the terms of their swaps contracts so that an
insolvency of the parent holding company will not trigger the contractual
right to terminate a subsidiary’s swaps contracts.95 There are efforts to
expand the scope of this collective deal beyond the largest financial
institutions, although not all counterparties are enthusiastic about
adopting the new approach.96 In addition, the “clean holding company”
provisions of the Fed’s TLAC rule will bar U.S. G-SIBs from providing
guarantees with cross-default rights for obligations of their subsidiaries
and will also prohibit subsidiaries from providing upstream guarantees
for the holding company’s obligations.97
More broadly, for the SPOE process to work regulators will have to
police against the creation of joint holding company and operating
company liabilities throughout the entire corporate structure.98
Regulation can preclude the creation of joint liabilities as a matter of
contract (as the “clean holding company’ provisions of the TLAC rule
seek to accomplish), but state agency and tort law might be another
matter. For example, employees of operating subsidiaries of JPMorgan
Chase who hold themselves out as employees of “Chase” might well
create liability for the holding company under agency law principles in a
way that completely undermines the separation necessary for SPOE to
work as designed. Likewise, joint holding and operating company
liabilities might be created under foreign law, regardless of U.S.
regulatory policies.
Another reason why holding company chapter 11 cases often fail is
that the holding company is rarely the source of financial distress. Indeed,
the only instance where exclusive focus on the holding company typically
93. William H. Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation
by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 433, 434 (1980).
94. Id. at 442.
95. William G. De Leon et al., Unintended Consequences of “Staying” Early Termination
Rights, PIMCO (Dec. 2014), http://www.pimco.com/EN/Insights/Pages/UnintendedConsequences-of-Staying-Early-Termination-Rights.aspx.
96. Id.
97. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8300–01.
98. Kwon-Yong Jin, How to Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Structure of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single Point of Entry
Resolution, 124 YALE L.J. 1746, 1772 (2015).

2017]

TOO BIG AND UNABLE TO FAIL

1225

makes sense is with a firm that has undergone a leveraged buyout.99 In
such a case, financial distress can result from “too much debt” issued by
the holding company.100 Removing the debt—often through the forcible
conversion of the holding company’s bondholders to shareholders—
solves that problem.
However, while SIFIs often operate with a high degree of leverage, a
major financial institution has never failed because of its inability to make
payments on long-term bonds. Instead, financial institutions typically fail
because of some sort of “run” by holders of short-term debt—broadly
defined to include all instances where depositors or other short-term
creditors flee the financial institution. Those “runs” typically originate in
an operating subsidiary. As explained below, SPOE does not provide
persuasive answers for solvency problems affecting subsidiaries of SIFIs.
An SPOE-style OLA proceeding would commence with the transfer
of the parent holding company’s assets (primarily the stock of its
subsidiaries) to a bridge financial company, the BFC, while the holding
company’s liabilities would stay behind in the “receivership estate.”101
Consider the simple model financial holding company presented earlier
in this Article, and ignore any complications resulting from the nature of
the principal subsidiary (which, as a depository bank, might not provide
a proper basis for an OLA proceeding):

HoldCo

BridgeCo

Bond debt
Publicly traded equity

BankCo
Intercompany debt held by BrdigeCo
Operating debt
Equity held by BridgeCo

99. BRADLEY DRAKE ET AL., A NOTE ON LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, DEFAULTS & BANKRUPTCY
2 (2014), https://turnaround.org/sites/default/files/%232%20A%20Note%20on%20Leveraged%
20Buyouts%20Defaults%20and%20Bankruptcy.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Strictly speaking, and unlike the Bankruptcy Code, OLA does not provide for the
creation of an estate. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 204–05, 210(a)(7)(D), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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BridgeCo, a holding company and also a blank slate, could sell stock
and bonds to recapitalize its corporate group. The timing gap between
commencement of the OLA and the sale of securities by BridgeCo could
be overcome if the FDIC provides interim funding to BridgeCo through
the Orderly Liquidation Fund, as described below.102
The subsidiary, BankCo, would be recapitalized by having its debt to
HoldCo/BridgeCo forgiven either directly or indirectly by means of an
exchange of the debt claims of HoldCo/BridgeCo for new equity in
BankCo.103 Of course, debt forgiveness would only solve the problem of
balance sheet insolvency and would not inject any new funding into the
corporate group. Thus, debt forgiveness (or debt-for-equity swaps) by
BridgeCo would not address the liquidity problems that BankCo would
likely confront. If BridgeCo could borrow funds by issuing new bonds, it
could downstream those funds to BankCo or other subsidiaries in
exchange for new intercompany debt or yet more equity.
In the more likely situation where BridgeCo is not able to sell any new
bonds (due to a lack of private-sector demand), the OLF would be the
obvious source for providing needed liquidity to BankCo. Lending from
the OLF is limited during the first thirty days of the resolution process,
when such lending is apt to be most vital, to just 10% of the financial
company’s assets.104 In the present example, that restriction would limit
lending from the OLF to BridgeCo to a figure equal to the total value of
BankCo, less BankCo’s operating debt, multiplied by 0.10. It is not clear
that OLF loans equal to 10% of the financial company’s assets would be
sufficient to solve the immediate liquidity problems of a bank or
securities broker–dealer whose parent company has just been placed into
OLA.105
After the first month of an OLA proceeding, the FDIC can provide
additional loans through the OLF “equal to 90 percent of the fair value of
the total consolidated assets of each covered financial company that are
available for repayment.”106 Thus, the FDIC might have to operate
BridgeCo with only a 10% equity cushion during this latter period, again
subject to the assumption that the financial institution was able to survive
the first thirty days of the case, when the FDIC’s ability to lend is
significantly constrained.
The FDIC’s ability to provide OLF loans based on the “fair value” of
BridgeCo’s assets—a phrase as flexible as other legal favorites like
102. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (2012). Of course, arguably the fund would not be used for
“liquidation” when used in connection with SPOE.
103. The latter might be wise to avoid any fraudulent transfer claims.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n)(6)(A).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 5390(n)(6)(B).
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“reasonable” or “material”—indicates that OLF loans to BridgeCo would
not be limited by the current fair market value of the assets of BankCo.107
Accordingly, the FDIC might be exposed to a risk of substantial losses
when it borrows from the OLF to provide needed liquidity to BridgeCo’s
operating subsidiaries. Moreover, the FDIC could effectively be
performing a liquidity transformation service—similar to that provided
by the Fed’s “discount window”—in allowing BridgeCo to monetize the
value of its subsidiaries at a point when private financing would probably
be unavailable.108
The FDIC’s experience during its rescue of Continental Illinois
(Continental) in 1984 indicates that the FDIC should be prepared to
provide large amounts of liquidity assistance to a SIFI after it has been
placed in an OLA receivership. After Continental experienced a massive
“silent run” by uninsured domestic and foreign depositors, the Fed
provided discount window loans to Continental and the FDIC issued a
blanket guarantee in May 1984, which covered all of Continental’s
depositors and other creditors.109 Despite those measures, the run on
Continental continued and federal regulators announced a permanent
assistance plan in July 1984. Under that plan, the FDIC injected $1 billion
of new capital into Continental by purchasing preferred stock, and the
FDIC also assumed responsibility for paying off Continental’s loans from
the Fed.110
By the end of August 1984, the FDIC, the Fed, and a supporting group
of private banks had provided more than $15 billion of funding to
Continental and held almost half of Continental’s total liabilities.111
The FDIC’s experience with Continental “suggests that, if an institution
needs to be resolved using OLA, the FDIC should be prepared for the
possibility that short-term creditors will make enormous demands for
withdrawals. That in turn could require large drawdowns from the
FDIC’s credit line with the Treasury [under the OLF].”112
A final source of liquidity for troubled subsidiaries of a failed SIFI
might be other subsidiaries in the group. A particularly “flush” subsidiary
could pay a dividend to BridgeCo, which could in turn loan the money to
any operating subsidiaries that need additional funds.
107. Id. § 5390(n).
108. See Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH.
L. REV. 185, 228–29 (2013).
109. Mark A. Carlson & Jonathan Rose, Can a Bank Run Be Stopped? Government
Guarantees and the Run on Continental Illinois 6–8 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper
No. 554, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2756472.
110. Id. at 8–9 (noting that the federal assistance plan for Continental “was one of the most
expensive ever arranged by financial regulators at the time: [T]he FDIC estimated its cost for the
bailout at $1.1 billion”).
111. Id. at 9–12, 13 tbl.3.
112. Id. at 30.
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Whatever the liquidity source, the foregoing discussion illustrates
several problems that could well result from attempting to “resolve” a
SIFI through a holding-company-only insolvency process. First, the
proposal assumes that funds will freely flow across the corporate group.
Foreign regulators, and state corporate and debtor–creditor laws might
present practical impediments here. For example, would it be consistent
with state fiduciary duties for the board of directors of a subsidiary not in
OLA to distribute potentially vitally needed cash to a distressed parent
company for transfer to a troubled subsidiary? Would such a distribution
constitute a fraudulent transfer? And if the subsidiary is a regulated entity,
would its regulator permit such a transfer?
Next is the matter of the subsidiary that caused the problems in the
first instance. The SPOE model implicitly assumes that the troubled
subsidiary should be recapitalized in nearly all cases. However, in many
cases, opening a funding spigot from the parent holding company will do
little to address the fundamental problem at issue.
Consider Lehman’s basic problem: it was heavily dependent on shortterm overnight repo funding, which it obtained by borrowing against its
extensive holdings of mortgage-backed securities.113 When the market
began to doubt the value of those securities, Lehman could no longer
obtain sufficient funding by rolling over its repos.114 Lehman’s parent
company did not have sufficient reserves to solve this problem by loaning
money to its operating subsidiaries.115 In Lehman’s situation, an SPOE
resolution by itself would not provide any new sources of external
funding; SPOE would simply move the operating subsidiaries’ problems
to the holding company level. To rescue its operating subsidiaries,
Lehman’s holding company would have been required to purchase the
subsidiaries’ mortgage-backed securities, but that requirement would
have led right back to the question of how the holding company could
fund such a purchase, given the unwillingness of private-sector firms to
provide additional loans to Lehman. Absent a government-arranged
source of liquidity, Lehman inevitably would have failed.116
American International Group (AIG) provides a similar example. One
part of AIG—its financial products division—issued credit default swaps
that represented a disastrous bet on the continued health of the American
housing market, while another division used funds received from lending
out the insurance companies’ high-quality securities to make huge and

113. John Crawford, Wargaming Financial Crises: The Problem of (In)experience and
Regulator Expertise, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 111, 151 (2014).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 153.
116. See Lee, supra note 6, at 454–61.
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risky investments in nonprime mortgage-backed securities.117 Neither of
AIG’s problems could be solved through an infusion of cash from the
parent company until the parent company itself received massive
assistance from the Fed and the Treasury.
In short, SPOE seems well designed to address balance sheet
insolvency problems in financial conglomerates from an accounting
standpoint, but balance sheet problems are unlikely to be the source of
potential crises at such a conglomerate. Instead, liquidity shortfalls at
troubled subsidiaries are likely to be the most pressing concern, and it is
far from clear whether SPOE can succeed in replenishing those shortfalls
without relying on a government source of funding such as the OLF.
A final reason to doubt the efficacy of SPOE turns on the realities of
how corporate groups operate, and the very real potential for group
contagion. As a rule, corporate groups, both inside and outside finance,
manage their liquidity and cash on a group-wide basis.118 From a
reputational perspective, corporate groups face the market as a single,
integrated whole, despite being comprised of hundreds, if not thousands,
of separate legal entities.119
This practical reality makes it highly improbable that all will be
“business as usual” at the operating subsidiaries after a SIFI’s parent
holding company has gone into OLA, because OLA is most likely to be
invoked in times of systemic stress. For conglomerate firms with retail
operations, especially in nonbank subsidiaries that are not protected by
the FDIC, any attempt to persuade brokerage or insurance customers that
“their” subsidiary is separate from the parent holding company that just
failed is likely to be a very hard sale. Even institutional investors might
hesitate to “stay the course” as long as the OLA process remains
comparatively untested and unknown, especially as compared with its
SIPA and chapter 11 counterparts. In short, placing the parent holding
company into an SPOE resolution would pose a substantial risk of
precipitating a run on the nominally solvent operating subsidiaries.120

117. See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943
(2009) (analyzing AIGs over-exposure to credit default swaps and mortgage-backed securities in
the lead-up to the financial crisis).
118. Brad B. Erens et al., Bankrupt Subsidiaries: The Challenges to the Parent of Legal
Separation, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 65, 131 (2008); see also Lynn M. Lopucki, The Death of
Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 49 (1996) (discussing how corporate groups manage their cash as a
single fund).
119. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 657
(2010).
120. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce,
39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1606–09 (2007) (providing historical examples of contagious runs on
subsidiaries that were triggered by the failures of their parent holding companies).
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B. Who Wants to Buy TLAC Debt and Become Structurally
Subordinated?
As a practical matter, Wall Street’s SPOE strategy and the Fed’s
TLAC rule create a very high probability of imposing losses from a GSIB’s failure on ordinary citizens, either as investors or as taxpayers. As
described above, SPOE and TLAC would protect operating subsidiaries
of failed G-SIBs, and creditors of those subsidiaries, from suffering any
losses. The Fed has stated that SPOE and TLAC are designed to make
sure that losses from resolving a failed G-SIB “would instead be borne
by the external TLAC holders of the [parent] holding company,”
including shareholders and bail-in debtholders.121 The Fed contends that
blanket protection for a failed G-SIB’s subsidiaries and their creditors is
essential because such an assurance will “help to maintain the confidence
of the operating subsidiaries’ creditors and counterparties, reducing their
incentives to engage in potentially destabilizing funding runs.”122 Thus,
the Fed’s TLAC rule will provide 100% protection for Wall Street
creditors, including uninsured depositors and holders of commercial
paper, repos, and derivatives, in order to create “reduced incentives to
run” among those creditors.123
Who would be the target audience for buying the parent holding
company’s TLAC debt, which would be used to protect subsidiaries and
their Wall Street creditors? The Fed’s TLAC rule strongly indicates that
individual investors, especially those holding interests in mutual funds
and pension funds, are expected to buy most of this loss-absorbing TLAC
debt. As the rule emphasizes, “it is desirable that the holding company’s

121. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations, 80 Fed. Reg.
74,926, 74,928, 74,944 (proposed Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217, 252); see
also Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations, 82 Fed. Reg.
8266, 8299–300 (Jan. 24, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252) (stating that “SPOE resolution
relies on imposing losses on the covered holding company’s [TLAC] creditors while protecting
the creditors and counterparties of its material operating subsidiaries” so that those “subsidiaries
would continue to operate normally upon the covered holding company’s entry into resolution”).
122. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 80 Fed. Reg. at 74,928; see also Total Loss-Absorbing
Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8298 (SPOE and TLAC are designed to reduce the incentives of shortterm creditors of operating subsidiaries to “run,” since those creditors “would not bear losses
incurred by the subsidiaries because those losses would instead be transferred to the [parent]
holding company and therefore borne by the external TLAC holders”).
123. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 80 Fed. Reg. at 74,944–45.
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creditors be limited to those entities that can be exposed to losses without
materially affecting financial stability.”124
The Fed and other federal bank regulators will undoubtedly take steps
to discourage depository institutions and their holding companies from
investing in TLAC debt. In November 2015, the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) declared that any investments in TLAC equity or debt by global
G-SIBs should be subject to a 100% deduction from their regulatory
capital in order to discourage them from investing in TLAC instruments
issued by other G-SIBs.125 The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision
(BCBS) took note of the FSB’s mandate when the BCBS issued a new
capital standard in October 2016.126 The new BCBS standard revises the
Basel III international capital accord to govern the treatment of TLAC
instruments.127 Under this new standard, internationally active banks
must deduct from their regulatory capital any holdings of TLAC
instruments issued by G-SIBs that exceed a specified threshold.128 When
the Fed adopted its TLAC rule two months later, the Fed indicated that it
“will work with other federal banking agencies to adopt the [capital]
deduction requirement on a coordinated basis” in accordance with the
BCBS standard.129
The new BCBS standard for TLAC instruments applies to all
internationally active banks (including both G-SIBs and non-G-SIBs).130
In adopting the new standard, the BCBS explained that the required
capital deduction for TLAC investments “reduces a significant source of
contagion in the banking system. Without deduction, holdings of TLAC
could mean that the failure of one G-SIB leads to a reduction in the loss
absorbency and recapitalization capacity of another bank.”131 Thus, the
new capital deduction is expressly designed to provide “sufficient
disincentives for banks to invest in TLAC.”132 Insurance regulators will
124. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8,299 (emphasis added).
125. FIN. STABILITY BD., PRINCIPLES ON LOSS-ABSORBING AND RECAPITALISATION CAPACITY
OF G-SIBS IN RESOLUTION: TOTAL LOSS-ABSORBING CAPACITY (TLAC) TERM SHEET 17 (2015)
[hereinafter FSB TLAC Principles], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/
TLAC-Principles-and-Term-Sheet-for-publication-final.pdf (“In order to reduce the risk of
contagion, G-SIBs must deduct from their own TLAC or regulatory capital [all] exposures to
eligible external TLAC instruments and liabilities issued by other G-SIBs.”).
126. BASEL COMM. ON BANK SUPERVISION, STANDARD: TLAC HOLDINGS: AMENDMENTS TO
THE BASEL III STANDARD ON THE DEFINITION OF CAPITAL 1 (2016) [hereinafter BCBS TLAC
Standard], http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d387.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1–2.
129. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8269.
130. BCBS TLAC Standard, supra note 126, at 1.
131. Id. at 1–2.
132. Id. at 2.
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likely adopt similar capital deduction rules to deter insurance companies
from investing in TLAC debt.
Assuming that depository institutions and insurance companies will
not buy TLAC debt, the most likely investors for such debt will be hedge
funds, mutual funds, and pension funds. Individual investors might also
buy TLAC debt through their brokerage accounts. According to a recent
study, asset managers (including mutual funds and pension funds)
purchased about half of the CoCos issued by foreign banks between 2013
and 2015.133 Hedge funds accounted for more than 10% of such
purchases.134 CoCos are a form of bail-in bonds that include many of the
features of TLAC debt.135
We anticipate that regulators will discourage G-SIBs from selling
substantial amounts of TLAC debt to hedge funds, because many of those
funds are major borrowers from megabanks through prime brokerage
arrangements.136 A write-off of TLAC debt held by hedge funds could
undermine financial stability by causing those funds to default on the
obligations they owe to G-SIBs.137
In contrast, regulators and executives of megabanks view mutual
funds and pension funds as leading prospective targets for sales of bailin debt.138 Government officials and G-SIB leaders evidently believe that,
unlike Wall Street creditors, retail investors in mutual funds and pension
funds can bear the costs of resolving failed megabanks without
undermining financial stability. HSBC Chairman Douglas Flint
expressed that belief with remarkable candor during his testimony before
a Parliamentary committee in October 2014.139 Mr. Flint declared that
society must choose between imposing the costs of resolving failed
megabanks on ordinary investors or on taxpayers.140 In his view, “At the
end of the day, the burden of failure rests with society. Whether you take
it out of society’s future income through taxation or whether you take it
through their pensions or savings, society is bearing the cost.”141
Mr. Flint did not mention the possibility that SIFIs or their insiders
might share any of the losses resulting from excessive risk-taking. His
133. Greene, supra note 21, at 27.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Laura Noonan, Prime Brokerage Reassessed as Banks Seek Growth and Stable
Earnings, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/403c2b14-0c64-11e6-9456444ab5211a2f.
137. See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 62.
138. See id. at 63–64.
139. Id. at 64.
140. Id.
141. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Mr. Flint’s testimony before the U.K. House of Lords’s
Select Committee on the European Union on Oct. 21, 2014).
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assertion that “society” must continue to bail out megabanks provides a
very revealing glimpse into the mindset that has prevailed among senior
executives on Wall Street and in the City of London before, during, and
after the financial crisis.142 Those leaders continue to believe that SIFIs
and their insiders should keep all of the short-term profits and bonuses
produced by their high-risk activities, while governments and ordinary
citizens must bear the burden of paying for the longer-term losses
imposed by SIFIs.143
C. TLAC and SPOE Together
Think back again to our model financial holding company, in which
HoldCo owns BankCo. In good times, HoldCo’s only assets will be a
package of debt and equity claims against BankCo. As a matter of basic
corporate finance, the overall value of this package can never be larger
than the value of BankCo itself. Because HoldCo’s claims are structurally
subordinated to those of other creditors of BankCo—since HoldCo’s debt
claims against BankCo will be forgiven upon its insolvency under SPOE,
and HoldCo’s equity claims are inherently subordinated—much of the
value of BankCo will be captured by other claimants of BankCo.
It is often suggested that SPOE’s success will depend on the financing
of HoldCo. For example, one commentator explains that
The critical element of the SPOE strategy is the
recapitalization of the company’s material operating
subsidiaries with the resources of the parent company. For
the SPOE top-down approach to work effectively, there must
be sufficient resources at the holding company level to
absorb all the losses of the firm, including losses sustained
by the operating subsidiaries. The capitalization of the
bridge financial company must be sufficient, simply by
virtue of the fact that the failed holding company’s
indebtedness is not transferred to the bridge, not only to
allow the operating subsidiaries to obtain needed capital
from the bridge to continue operations but also to allow
stakeholders and the broader public to view the entity as safe
and viable as it transitions from failed firm to bridge
142. Id. at 64–65.
143. Id.; see SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 12 (1st ed. 2010) (“The basic, massive subsidy scheme [for
SIFIs] remains unchanged: when times are good, the banks keep the upside as executive and trader
compensation; when times are bad and potential crisis looms, the government picks up the bill.”);
see also Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 65 n.86 (noting that “major U.K. banks pushed for
deregulation and ‘light touch’ supervision” before the financial crisis, and ultimately “U.K.
authorities were forced to bail out four of the nine largest U.K. banks”).
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financial company, and ultimately to emergence as a new
firm.144
The assumption that SPOE will work so long as HoldCo has
“sufficient resources” (including bail-in debt) ignores the likely outer
limit to such “resources.” In short, HoldCo will only be able to issue as
much debt as its assets—the debt and equity claims it holds against
BankCo—will support.
At the very outer limit, HoldCo can only borrow to the point where its
interest payments do not exceed the cash flow generated by its debt and
equity holdings in BankCo. That situation would leave HoldCo facing
extreme refinancing risk, such that it is hard to imagine prudential
regulators ever allowing such a high degree of debt financing.
Moreover, following entry into OLA, the borrowing ability of
HoldCo/BridgeCo is apt to drop off a cliff. After all, the holding
company’s borrowing ability is a function of the value of its subsidiaries’
assets, and presumably a large portion of those assets will have just
experienced an adverse shock that was significant enough to warrant the
invocation of OLA.145
Thus, a post-insolvency BridgeCo is likely to have substantially
diminished borrowing capacity. It therefore seems highly doubtful that
BridgeCo will be able to obtain enough new private sector funding to
recapitalize its troubled subsidiaries. As shown above, if funds invested
by HoldCo’s shareholders and TLAC debtholders are not sufficient to
recapitalize HoldCo’s subsidiaries, and if additional private sector
funding is not available, the FDIC would have to rely on taxpayerfinanced loans from the OLF to fill the remaining gap. During
congressional deliberations over Dodd-Frank, Wall Street repeatedly
blocked proposals that would have required SIFIs to pay risk-based
premiums to prefund the OLF.146 As a result, the OLF currently has a
zero balance, and the FDIC must take out Treasury-approved loans from
the OLF to cover any net losses from resolving a failed G-SIB.147
Ordinarily the FDIC must repay OLF loans within five years by
imposing special assessments on large financial institutions. However,
the Treasury Department can extend OLF loans indefinitely in order “to
avoid a serious adverse effect on the financial system of the United
States.”148 During a future financial crisis, many large banks probably
144. REBECCA J. SIMMONS, BANKING PERSPECTIVE, SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY: A STRATEGY
36, 41 (2014), www.sullcrom.com/
siteFiles/Publications/007singlepointofentry.pdf.
145. See 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012).
146. Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 46.
147. Id. at 66–67, 74.
148. Id. at 67 (discussing and quoting 12 U.S.C. § 210(n)(9)(B), (o)(1)(B), (C) (2012)).
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would be too weak to pay special assessments, and Treasury would
therefore feel obliged to extend OLF loans far beyond their standard fiveyear term. As a result, OLF loans would become lengthy, taxpayerfinanced bridge loans. Thus, SPOE and TLAC are very likely to shift
most or all of the burden of bailing out failed SIFIs from Wall Street
creditors to ordinary citizens, either as investors or taxpayers.149
The SPOE–TLAC strategy relies on the further assumption that
regulators can successfully impose losses on TLAC debtholders after a
SIFI fails without encountering serious political problems and without
triggering runs by uninsured creditors at other troubled SIFIs. In fact,
however, any decision by regulators to impose losses on bail-in
debtholders of a failed SIFI would probably face serious political
obstacles and would likely trigger contagious spillover effects for other
vulnerable SIFIs. In a 2014 paper, Professors Charles Goodhart and
Emilios Avgouleas warned that any attempt to impose large losses on
bail-in debt held by mutual funds and pension funds could ignite a
political firestorm.150 In addition, as they pointed out,
[T]riggering the bail-in process is likely to generate a
capital flight and a sharp rise in funding costs whenever the
need for large-scale recapitalisations becomes apparent.
Creditors who sense in advance the possibility of a bail-in,
or creditors of institutions that are similar in terms of
nationality or business models will have a strong incentive
to withdraw deposits, sell debt, or hedge their positions
through the short-selling of equity or the purchase of credit
protection at an ever higher premium disrupting the relevant
markets.151
Recent events have confirmed the prescience of their warnings.152 In
December 2015, the Italian government rescued four regional banks and
imposed almost $400 million of losses on holders of their subordinated
debt.153 Many of the debtholders were consumers who had been
persuaded by their banks to convert their deposits into subordinated

149. Id. at 61–68.
150. Charles Goodhart & Emilios Avgouleas, A Critical Evaluation of Bail-Ins as Bank
Recapitalisation Mechanisms 30–31 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy, Research Discussion Paper No.
10065, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478647.
151. Id. at 32.
152. James Politi, Italy Bank Rescues Spark Bail-in Debate as Anger at Renzi Grows, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015), https://next.ft.com/content/54cda5e4-a6ac-11e5-955c-1e1d6de94879.
153. Giada Zampano & Liam Moloney, Renzi, Confident on Italian Banks Amid Rescue Plan
Storm, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/renzi-confident-on-italianbanks-amid-rescue-plan-storm-1451405238.

1236

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

bonds.154 The debtholders’ losses provoked a strong political backlash
against then Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and caused many investors to
dump their holdings of subordinated debt in Italian banks.155
On December 29, 2015, the Portuguese government caused a similar
outcry when it imposed €2 billion of losses on institutional bondholders
at Novo Banco, a bridge bank created in 2014 following the collapse of
Banco Espirito Santo (BES).156 The government decreed that certain
bonds issued by Novo Banco would be transferred to a “bad bank,” which
held BES’s toxic assets, in order to help cover the costs of resolving
BES.157 The bond transfer sparked strong protests as well as a lawsuit by
affected bondholders.158 The government’s action also led to widespread
investor sales of bonds issued by Novo Banco and other Portuguese
banks.159
The losses suffered by bondholders in Italy and Portugal set the stage
for a much larger disruption of the market for CoCos issued by European
banks in February 2016.160 Investors expressed growing doubts about the
resilience of leading European banks, including the ability of Deutsche
Bank and Credit Suisse to meet debt service obligations on their CoCos
and other bonds after both banks reported large year-end losses.161
Investors also voiced increasing concerns about the potential impact of
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) issued by the
European Union (EU).162 The BRRD, which took effect in January 2016,
requires regulators to impose losses on bail-in bondholders when
154. Id.
155. Tom Beardsworth & Sonia Sirletti, Italy Banks Facing Funding Threat as Bond Sales
Scrutinized, 105 Banking Rep. (BNA) 929, 105 BBR 929 (BNA) (Dec. 21, 2015); Politi, supra
note 152; Zampano & Moloney, supra note 153.
156. Thomas Hale & Martin Arnold, Novo Banco: Fourteen Asset Managers Sue Portuguese
Central Bank, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/e4762f38-fa97-11e5-8f41df5bda8beb40.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Martin Arnold & Thomas Hale, Southern Europe’s Banks Feel Cost of Portuguese
Actions at Novo Banco, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/93be3c46-bbba11e5-b151-8e15c9a029fb; Philippe Bodereau, Discrimination at Portuguese Bank Novo Banco
Sets a Dangerous Precedent, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/198e08eab62c-11e5-8358-9a82b43f6b2f; Hale & Arnold, supra note 156.
160. Jim Brunsden & Alex Barker, Bank Turmoil: Are Europe’s New Bail-In Rules to
Blame?, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/8ad2ed98-d0a0-11e5-986a62c79fcbcead.
161. Tom Beardsworth & Cordell Eddings, Systemic Risk: The $102 Billion of Bank Debt
That’s Making Investors Nervous, 106 Banking Rep. (BNA) 231, 106 BBR 231 (BNA) (Feb. 9,
2016).
162. Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Limits on State-Funded Bailouts in the EU Bank Resolution
Regime (European Banking Inst.., Working Paper No. 2, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2912165.
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European banks fail.163 In response to increased uncertainty about the
future performance of bail-in debt, investors engaged in a massive selloff
of CoCos issued by European banks, and Deutsche Bank and Credit
Suisse were among the hardest-hit institutions.164 As the editors of
Bloomberg observed,
The incident serves to reinforce concerns, expressed by
various financial economists, that CoCo bonds may make
investors in banks and their debt more apt to take flight when
trouble looms. . . . CoCos are complicated instruments. In a
time of stress, uncertainty over the conditions that trigger
conversions [into equity] may add to the sense of alarm.165
Another potential crisis involving bail-in debt emerged in December
2016, as Italy struggled to prevent the collapse of Banca Monte dei Paschi
di Siena (MPS), the country’s third-largest bank.166 Italy requested the
EU’s permission to inject several billion euros of new capital into MPS
as a “precautionary recapitalization,” an approach that would sidestep the
BRRD’s strict mandate for imposing losses on bail-in bonds issued by
insolvent banks.167 Italy crafted its recapitalization plan to avoid
imposing losses on some 40,000 retail investors who owned MPS’s
subordinated debt.168 Italian officials hoped that sparing those retail
bondholders would avert the type of political explosion that occurred in
late 2015, when (as described above) Italy forced retail investors to incur
losses on subordinated debt issued by four troubled regional banks.169
Some European officials and commentators warned that the EU would
163. Id.
164. For analysis of the disruption that occurred in the market for European bank CoCos in
early 2016, see Beardsworth & Eddings, supra note 161; Brunsden & Barker, supra note 160;
John Glover, Deutsche Bank CoCo Holders See What Regulators Mean by Risk, 106 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 233, 106 BBR 233 (BNA) (Feb. 11, 2016); Greene, supra note 21, at 33–34; Thomas
Hale, Music Stops for Buyers of Bank Coco Debt, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://next.ft.com/content/f921e592-d0af-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377. For an overview of the
BRRD’s requirements for resolving failed European banks, including the mandatory imposition
of losses on bail-in bonds, see Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 162.
165. The Trouble with CoCos, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Feb. 12, 2016, 7:00 A.M.),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-02-12/the-trouble-with-cocos.
166. James Politi & Rachel Sanderson, Italy’s Cabinet Approves Monte dei Paschi Bailout,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/a018e818-c831-11e6-90437e34c07b46ef.
167. Alexander Weber, International Banking: Monte Paschi Rescue May Usher in New
Bailout Era, Watchdog Says, 108 Banking Rep. (BNA) 159, 108 BBR 159 (BNA) (Jan. 23, 2017).
168. Jim Brunsden et al., Monte dei Paschi Bailout Comes Under Fire in Berlin, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/b407a570-c918-11e6-8f29-9445cac8966f.
169. For analysis of the controversy surrounding Italy’s recapitalization plan for MPS, see
Jim Brunsden et al., supra note 168; Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 162; Politi & Sanderson, supra
note 166; Weber, supra note 167.
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seriously undermine the BRRD’s credibility if the EU allowed Italy to go
forward with its recapitalization plan for MPS and thereby avoid the
BRRD’s stringent bail-in rules for insolvent banks. The European Central
Bank (ECB) gave provisional approval to the MPS recapitalization plan
at the end of 2016.170 However, as this Article went to press in early 2017,
it was not clear whether the EU would concur with the ECB and permit
Italy to proceed with the plan.171
The market disruptions and political controversies surrounding
European bank CoCos and other types of bail-in bonds highlight the
volatility and fragility associated with bail-in debt. As shown by the herdlike behavior of investors in European bank CoCos, TLAC debt is not
likely to perform a robust loss-absorbing function during periods of
market stress.172 Moreover, during a future financial crisis it is doubtful
whether politicians and regulators would be willing to trigger a political
crisis by imposing large losses on ordinary investors in mutual funds and
pension funds that own TLAC debt. If TLAC debt fails to perform as
designed, SPOE will not work as designed either.
D. Chapter 14
Under Title I of Dodd-Frank, SIFIs are obliged to prepare resolution
plans—often referred to as “living wills”—that outline plans for their
resolution under the Bankruptcy Code.173 However, there are legitimate
doubts about the usefulness of the current Code as applied to a financial
institution.174 Key concerns include the lack of any statutorily defined
role for banking regulators under the Code, bankruptcy’s traditional focus
on creditor recovery, which might conflict with systemic stability,175 and
the “safe harbors” that exempt certain types of securities and derivatives
contracts from core elements of the Code.176
Almost from the moment Dodd-Frank was enacted, various groups
have proposed ways to amend the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate the

170. Brunsden et al., supra note 168.
171. Alex Barker et al., Brussels and ECB Split on Monte dei Paschi’s Capital Proposals,
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/9635b04c-f923-11e6-bd4e68d53499ed71; Brunsden et al., supra note 168.
172. Greene, supra note 21, at 31–35.
173. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2012); see Jonathan C. Lipson, Against Regulatory Displacement:
An Institutional Analysis of Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 673, 721–22 (2015).
174. Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 137–38 (2012).
175. Edward J. Janger, Arbitraging Systemic Risk: System Definition, Risk Definition,
Systemic Interaction, and the Problem of Asymmetric Treatment, 92 TEX. L. REV. 217, 224 (2014).
176. Stephen D. Adams, Swap Safe Harbors in Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank: A Structural
Analysis, 20 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 91, 113 (2014).
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resolution of SIFIs.177 In some cases, these proposals would supplement
OLA, in others they would replace it entirely. Such proposals are
frequently designated as “chapter 14” proposals, after a proposal first put
forth by the Hoover Institution’s Working Group on Economic Policy.178
Perhaps the most significant of these proposals is the Financial
Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2016, which was passed by the House in
early 2016.179 This bill would create a new subchapter V within chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code to allow the SPOE approach to be used in
bankruptcy court.
Under this bill, a financial holding company would be placed into
bankruptcy, and its assets—equity in and debt claims against
subsidiaries—would be transferred to a bridge institution.180 The
legislation would also require expedited judicial review by a bankruptcy
judge randomly chosen from a pool of judges designated in advance and
selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for their experience,
expertise, and willingness to preside over these cases.181
Amending the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate financial
institutions makes a good deal of sense if Dodd-Frank’s preference for
normal bankruptcy procedures is to be realized.182 That said, the Financial
Institution Bankruptcy Act and many similar proposals do little more than
allow the use of SPOE in bankruptcy proceedings outside of OLA. The
current chapter 14 proposals do nothing to facilitate the use of more
established and broadly applicable insolvency tools—most notably
chapter 11—by financial institutions.
Thus, the usefulness of these proposals will rise and fall with one’s
appraisal of the workability of SPOE. As indicated above, this Article
strongly questions the ability of SPOE to handle most resolutions of
failed SIFIs.
In a recent paper, Professor Howell E. Jackson and law student
Stephanie Massman identify the ability to move capital among different
177. Bruce Grohsgal, The Case in Brief Against “Chapter 14,” AM. BANKR. INST. J.
(May 2014), http://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2014/06/17/the-case-in-brief-against
-chapter-14/.
178. Thomas H. Jackson & David A. Skeel, Jr., Dynamic Resolution of Large Financial
Institutions, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 435, 458 (2012). Lubben expressed some doubt about the
workings of this initial proposal in his New York Times column. Stephen J. Lubben, What’s
Wrong with the Chapter 14 Proposal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013, 6:17 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/whats-wrong-with-the-chapter-14-proposal/?_r=0.
179. The similar Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act, S. 1841, 114th Cong.
(2016), is currently in committee in the Senate.
180. H.R. REP. NO. 114-477, at 15 (2016).
181. Id. at 16.
182. David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New
Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 198 (2012).
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entities within the corporate group as one of the key differences between
OLA and chapter 14.183 In an OLA proceeding the FDIC controls the
entire process, and can compel the movement of capital from the parent
holding company to the endangered subsidiary that needs it.184 In a
chapter 14 proceeding, however, creditors might object to the transfer of
assets out of the parent holding company’s bankruptcy estate.185 And
transfers made by the parent holding company prior to the bankruptcy
might be subject to avoidance as fraudulent transfers, since the parent
might not have received “reasonably equivalent value” for those
transfers.186 Thus, as Jackson and Massman point out, “[w]hile a
bankruptcy court judge might ultimately accept the downstream
[transfers] of holding-company value that SPOE strategy contemplates,
experience . . . suggests the process will not be easy, adding another mark
against the bankruptcy court alternative as opposed to OLA under Title
II [of Dodd-Frank].”187
Jackson and Massman propose to solve this problem by using section
365(o) of the Bankruptcy Code.188 That section was enacted as part of the
Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer
Recovery Act of 1990.189 Section 365(o) provides that “[i]n a case under
chapter 11 of this title, the trustee shall be deemed to have assumed
(consistent with the debtor’s other obligations under section 507), and
shall immediately cure any deficit under, any commitment by the debtor
to a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency.”190 In short, in a
chapter 11 case dealing with a failed bank’s parent holding company, the
holding company’s bankruptcy trustee must assume any agreement that
the holding company made with the FDIC to recapitalize its insured bank
subsidiary.
Jackson and Massman propose that a G-SIB’s parent holding
company could route all of its recapitalization commitments for operating
subsidiaries through an FDIC-insured subsidiary bank, so that in chapter
14 the bankruptcy trustee for the parent holding company will be
compelled to assume those obligations.191
In addition to its assumption and immediate cure requirement, section
365(o) addresses the priority of a claim arising from an obligation under
183. Howell E. Jackson & Stephanie Massman, The Resolution of Distressed Financial
Conglomerates, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 48, 50 (2017).
184. Id. at 50, 61.
185. Id. at 55.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
187. Jackson & Massman, supra note 183, at 61.
188. Id. at 65.
189. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2522, 104 Stat. 4859, 4866 (1990).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 365(o).
191. Jackson & Massman, supra note 183, at 65–66.
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a capital maintenance commitment made by a bank holding company.192
The second portion of the statute provides that any claim for a
“subsequent breach of . . . obligations [under a commitment to maintain
the capital of a federally insured depository institution] shall be entitled
to priority under section 507.”193 The reference to section 507 in section
365(o) directs the reader to section 507(a)(9). That provision, also
enacted as part of the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution
and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990, places “unsecured claims based
upon any commitment by the debtor to a Federal depository institutions
regulatory agency . . . to maintain the capital of an insured depository
institution” in ninth priority in a bankruptcy case.194
The priority issue raised by section 507 immediately suggests a
potentially significant problem with the Jackson–Massman approach—
putting to one side the FDIC’s likely lack of enthusiasm for tying the
insured bank to all recapitalization commitments for other operating
subsidiaries. Namely, the obligation by a bankruptcy trustee to assume a
contract does not necessarily translate into immediate performance of the
contract, and it is important not to conflate the two. Instead, the trustee
might choose to assume the contract and then breach it, leaving the
holding company’s subsidiaries with priority claims in a reorganization
plan that might be years away from completion. Holding such bankruptcy
claims will do nothing to keep the subsidiaries operating in the meantime.
Section 365(o) provides that the parent holding company shall
immediately cure any default under a recapitalization agreement with a
federal banking agency.195 That seems to require performance, but by its
terms the obligation to cure only applies if the debtor stays in chapter 11
(or one presumes, “chapter 14”). A bankruptcy trustee in a chapter 7
liquidation would have no such obligation to cure, and for this reason
alone some creditors might prefer to proceed under that chapter.
Moreover, as one bankruptcy treatise notes, there might be plausible
reasons for the holding company to delay its performance under such an
agreement:
[S]ection 365(o) does not extend any commitment that
would otherwise be terminated by any act of a federal
depository institutions regulatory agency. While no cases
address this point, a plain reading of the statute suggests that
section 365(o) does not enlarge the power of a federally
insured depository institution to enforce a debtor’s
commitment to maintain capital if the institution’s own
192.
193.
194.
195.

11 U.S.C. § 365(o).
Id.
Id. § 507(a)(9).
Id. § 365(o).
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actions would have otherwise terminated that commitment.
This also suggests that the immediate curing requirement
would be delayed if there is a dispute regarding whether the
institution’s own action would have otherwise terminated
the commitment.196
Thus, while Jackson and Massman have identified a real problem with
importing SPOE into the Bankruptcy Code, their proposed solution may
not be practicable under bankruptcy law.197 More generally, one of
SPOE’s central goals seems to be to create a resolution model that would
enable the Fed to bail out the operating subsidiaries of failed SIFIs and
thereby protect those subsidiaries’ Wall Street counterparties. The Fed
does not have authority, however, to make discount window loans to
nondepository companies such as securities broker–dealers.198
In addition, Dodd-Frank places significant constraints on the Fed’s
ability to provide financial assistance to nondepository companies under
section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.199 Under section 13(3) as
amended by Dodd-Frank, the Fed does retain the ability to provide
liquidity assistance to nondepository companies pursuant to a “program
or facility with broad-based eligibility,” provided the recipients of that
liquidity assistance are not insolvent.200 Following the quick balance
sheet restructuring contemplated by SPOE, nondepository operating
subsidiaries of a failed SIFI could argue that they are not insolvent and,
therefore, are eligible to receive loans from the Fed under such a “broadbased” program. Thus, the SPOE resolution strategy could potentially
boost the Fed’s ability to assist operating subsidiaries of a troubled SIFI
under section 13(3), and that would be true under either OLA or the
proposed chapter 14.
In our view, there are at least three reasons why Wall Street strongly
supports proposed chapter 14 and is much less enthusiastic about OLA.
First, when a SIFI is placed in receivership under OLA, section 206(4) of
196. BLOOMBERG LAW: BANKRUPTCY TREATISE, pt. I, ch. 48, at § 365(o), (Hon. D. Michael
Lynn et al. eds., 2017) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
197. Perhaps somewhat more realistically, it has recently been proposed that all SIFIs adopt
two holding companies, so that the second layer holding company can act as a central hub for
group funds, while the top level holding company goes into SPOE.
198. See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012); William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Remarks at the Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2016 Financial Markets Conference, Market and
Funding Liquidity: An Overview (May 1, 2016), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
speeches/2016/dud160501.
199. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A); see John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial
Safety Nets, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 121 (2015); Wilmarth, supra note 26, at 1001–02.
200. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A); see Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the
Dodd-Frank Act End Too Big to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 82 (2012); Wilmarth, supra
note 26, at 1002–03.
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Dodd-Frank compels the FDIC to remove all executives and directors
who were responsible for the SIFI’s failure.201 In contrast, chapter 14
proposals do not contain any similar requirement for removing executives
or directors of a failed SIFI.
Second, as discussed above, the FDIC is required to impose special
assessments on large financial institutions in order to repay any OLF
loans that cannot be paid off from the assets of a failed SIFI. 202 In
contrast, the financial industry would bear no responsibility for repaying
any loans that the Fed might advance to operating subsidiaries of a failed
SIFI under section 13(3). The obligation to repay such loans would rest
with the borrower alone.
Third, Wall Street would strongly prefer to work with the Fed rather
than the FDIC in resolving failed SIFIs. Compared with the Fed, the
FDIC has generally followed a much stricter policy toward megabanks.
The two agencies’ different supervisory philosophies reflect their
contrasting missions and structures. The FDIC is primarily concerned
with protecting depositors and maintaining the solvency of the deposit
insurance fund. That mission causes the FDIC to resist aggressive risktaking by megabanks. The FDIC is also insulated from industry influence
due to its monopoly position as deposit insurer, its support from the
public, and its status as an independent agency. In contrast, one of the
Fed’s core objectives is to preserve financial stability, and that goal
inclines the Fed to support large financial institutions and prevent their
failure. In addition, the Fed’s private–public ownership and governance
structure—in which member banks own shares in regional Federal
Reserve Banks and elect Reserve Bank directors, who in turn participate
in nominating Reserve Bank Presidents—has promoted a cozy
relationship between the banking industry and the Fed.203
Thus, the apparent goals of Wall Street in promoting the chapter 14
approach are to provide more generous public support and more favorable
regulatory treatment for failed SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries,
while also evading Dodd-Frank’s mandates for removal of senior
managers of a failed SIFI and for repayment of the public costs of an
OLA resolution by large financial institutions. None of those objectives
would make a positive contribution toward solving the TBTF problem.
In fact, the chapter 14 approach threatens to perpetuate and entrench
TBTF treatment for troubled SIFIs and their Wall Street creditors.

201. 12 U.S.C. § 5386(4).
202. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
203. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 941–50
(2012); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall
Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1401–05 (2013).
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III. IMPROVING SPOE, TLAC, AND “CHAPTER 14”
For the reasons stated above, SPOE’s claimed ability to restructure the
parent holding company of a failed G-SIB while keeping its subsidiaries
in operation is open to serious question, especially during a systemic
financial crisis. In a 2016 speech, Neel Kashkari, President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, noted that SPOE, TLAC, and other new
resolution tools might work “while the economy and [our] financial
system are otherwise healthy and stable.”204 However, he was “far more
skeptical that these tools will be useful to policymakers in . . . a stressed
economic environment.”205 Based on his experience as a senior Treasury
official during the height of the financial crisis in 2008 and his
recognition of “the massive externalities on Main Street of large bank
failures in terms of lost jobs, lost income and lost wealth,”206 Mr.
Kashkari concluded, “[N]o rational policymaker would risk restructuring
large [financial] firms and forcing losses on creditors and counterparties
using the new tools in a risky environment, let alone in a crisis
environment like we experienced in 2008. They will be forced to bail out
failing institutions—as we were.”207
This Part begins with the assumption that the statutory framework for
regulating SIFIs, including Dodd-Frank, will remain in its current form,
and that any improvements must be made within the existing regulatory
structure. Given those practical constraints, this Part offers several
suggestions for making TLAC, SPOE, and even “chapter 14” advance the
basic goal of ending TBTF.
First, as the Fed has acknowledged, the sale of TLAC debt must be
accompanied by adequate disclosures of the extraordinary risks
embedded in that debt.208 However, the Fed’s disclosure requirements for
TLAC debt are far too vague and too mild. 209 A much more robust
disclosure regime for TLAC debt is urgently needed.
204. Neel Kashkari, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Speech at the Brookings
Institution: Lessons from the Crisis: Ending Too Big to Fail, (Feb. 16, 2016) (transcript available
at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/lessons-from-the-crisis
-ending-too-big-to-fail).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations, 82 Fed. Reg.
8266, 8303 (Jan. 24, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252).
209. In full, the disclosure provision of the Fed’s TLAC rule provides:
§ 252.65 Disclosure requirements.
(a) A global systemically important BHC must publicly disclose a description of
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Under our recommended approach, individual investors purchasing
TLAC debt directly through their online brokerage accounts would be
presented with an online warning box, much like the warnings often
provided for purchases of high-yield debt. All written offering documents
for TLAC debt would contain a highlighted, “black box” warning about
the risks associated with such instruments. For both electronic and written
disclosures, the box would contain a simple, straightforward,
standardized warning, such as:
If the Company fails and is “taken over” by regulators, it is
expected that these securities will receive little or no
recovery. You could lose your entire investment. 210
Similarly, we would require mutual funds or pension funds that invest
in TLAC debt to disclose the bail-in risks to investors and include in their
offering materials the “black box” warning proposed above. Each such
fund would also be required to disclose the maximum percentage of the
fund’s assets that could potentially be invested in TLAC debt, and the
possible correlation and contagion risks presented by such debt, even if
issued by multiple SIFIs.
We also recommend that each SIFI that issues TLAC debt should
maintain a dedicated web page that is readily accessible on its main
website and describes the material provisions of its resolution plan in
reasonable detail. On that page, the company should set forth, in both text
and diagrams, the complete “waterfall” for allocating losses incurred by
the parent holding company among holders of its equity and debt. Based
on that “waterfall” disclosure, current or prospective TLAC debtholders

the financial consequences to unsecured debtholders of the global systemically
important BHC entering into a resolution proceeding in which the global
systemically important BHC is the only entity that would be subject to the
resolution proceeding.
(b) A global systemically important BHC must provide the disclosure required
by paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) In the offering documents for all of its eligible [TLAC] debt securities; and
(2) Either:
(i) On the global systemically important BHC’s Web site; or
(ii) In more than one public financial report or other public regulatory reports,
provided that the global systemically important BHC publicly provides a
summary table specifically indicating the location(s) of this disclosure.͒
Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8310.
210. In adopting its final TLAC rule, the Fed considered the possibility of requiring issuers
of TLAC debt to include such a prominent disclosure box in their offering materials, but the Fed
chose not to do so. Id. at 8303.
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should be able to ascertain the point at which they will begin to incur
losses, and the point at which their entire investments will be vaporized.
Each SIFI’s resolution web page should also contain a straightforward
discussion of the role of TLAC debt in the SIFI’s capital structure. TLAC
debtholders should be clearly told that their claims are deeply
subordinated, and that they are taking on risks that creditors and
counterparties of operating subsidiaries are unwilling to assume. Only
with such candid and detailed disclosures can we be reasonably confident
that TLAC debt will be appropriately priced by the market.
It is likely that our proposed disclosures would compel SIFIs to pay
relatively high interest rates on TLAC debt that reflect the bail-in risks
inherent in TLAC debt. If SIFIs wish to avoid paying such interest rates,
they could issue larger amounts of equity capital to satisfy their TLAC
mandates. Such an outcome would be highly desirable, in our view.
Second, the Fed should revise its TLAC rule to allow G-SIBs to meet
their entire TLAC obligations by issuing Tier 1 equity capital. Unlike
debt, Tier 1 equity instruments (common stock and perpetual, noncumulative preferred stock) do not have any maturity dates, do not have
any fixed obligations to pay interest, and can forgo paying dividends
when necessary to conserve capital. As regulators have recently
acknowledged, Tier 1 equity capital provides a far superior buffer for
absorbing losses, compared with debt.211
In adopting its final rule, the Fed considered the possibility of
allowing G-SIBs to satisfy their entire TLAC mandates by issuing Tier 1
equity capital.212 However, the Fed decided to retain its requirement that
each G-SIB must maintain a minimum amount of TLAC debt.213 The Fed
justified that decision by claiming that a minimum requirement for TLAC
debt “would enhance the prospects for the successful resolution of a
failed GSIB and thereby better address the [TBTF] problem.”214
The Fed did not present any evidence to support its remarkable claim
that TLAC debt will have a better loss-absorbing capacity than Tier 1
equity. That assertion is refuted by the highly dubious recent record of
CoCos and other forms of bail-in debt at European banks, as well as
compelling evidence of the superior performance of Tier 1 equity as a
211. See Regulatory Capital Rules, 79 Fed. Reg. 24,528, 24,535 (May 1, 2014) (affirming
that common equity Tier 1 capital has “the highest capacity to absorb losses” while noncumulative perpetual preferred stock “has strong loss-absorbing capacity”); Wilmarth, supra note
10, at 66. For a comprehensive demonstration of the clear superiority of equity capital over debt
as a loss-absorbing buffer for banks, see generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE
BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013).
212. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8273–74.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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loss-absorbing buffer.215 If the Fed’s claim were correct, the Fed should
compel G-SIBs to satisfy all of their TLAC mandates by issuing TLAC
debt rather than Tier 1 equity. Of course, neither the Fed nor anyone else
(except, perhaps, some supporters and executives of megabanks) believes
that would be a sound policy. Accordingly, the Fed should allow G-SIBs
to satisfy their entire TLAC requirements by issuing Tier 1 equity and
should remove the provision of its TLAC rule that requires G-SIBs to
maintain a minimum amount of TLAC debt.216
Third, with regard to SPOE, we recommend two alternatives for
establishing mandatory liquidity reserves. Because the use of SPOE
necessitates the provision of massive amounts of liquidity to operating
subsidiaries, dedicated liquidity reserves must be in place in advance of
financial distress. Ideally, in our view, such reserves should be created by
amending Dodd-Frank to require SIFIs to pay risk-based premiums to
establish a pre-funded OLF.217 Barring such a change to Dodd-Frank, we
propose that SIFIs should be required to maintain dedicated reserves of
“internal” liquidity funds within their holding companies.
This Article has identified several reasons for doubting the ability of
parent holding companies of SIFIs to add limitless amounts of debt to
their capital structure.218 However, SIFIs could certainly build their
liquidity reserves by issuing additional Tier 1 equity. Whatever the
source, each SIFI’s parent holding company must maintain a substantial
amount of dedicated, uncommitted liquid funds that are available for
immediate loans to distressed subsidiaries if SPOE is to have any hope of
working. Simply forgiving intercompany debt will not solve problems
resulting from demands for immediate liquidity from operating
subsidiaries, and it cannot be assumed that “prepositioned” capital will
just happen to be located in the right place at the onset of financial
distress.
Finally, if SPOE is to work, it also must migrate into something more
like “dual point of entry.” That is, there needs to be a well-specified plan
for resolution of both the holding company and any distressed subsidiary.
Only such a plan will provide a realistic description of how financial
distress within a SIFI might be contained. Such a plan might realistically
save the non-distressed subsidiaries, but it will also have to address the
reality that a parent holding company is not likely to solve serious funding
215. See supra notes 160–72, 211 and accompanying text.
216. See Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8308 (adopting 12 C.F.R. § 252.62,
which would codify that requirement).
217. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: DoddFrank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG.
151, 190–91 (2011); Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 73–79.
218. See supra notes 113–08, 144–46 and accompanying text.
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problems at multiple distressed subsidiaries without the functional
equivalent of a government bailout.
With regard to chapter 14, or any other attempt to make the
Bankruptcy Code work better for SIFIs, we recommend that SPOE be
reworked as we have outlined. We also believe that the Bankruptcy Code
should be amended for large financial companies in a way that does not
tie its use to SPOE. Instead, a new subchapter of chapter 11—like that
already in place for railroads219—could be enacted with provisions that
address the specific problems and challenges of financial institutions,
regardless of the method that a SIFI chooses to reorganize or liquidate.
Specific provisions of such a subchapter should include: standing for
regulators to participate in proceedings involving SIFIs; the ability of
regulators to institute involuntary cases against SIFIs; specific statutory
ability to conduct short notice “363 sales” to bridge companies, as was
done in Lehman and the automakers’ chapter 11 cases; and a short stay
on any financial claims covered by “safe harbors.”220 The new subchapter
should not lock a SIFI into any particular resolution mechanism.
In addition, we should not pretend that private market funding for
chapter 14 cases will always be available. Many of the largest U.S. GSIBs are themselves key players in the “DIP loan” market, which
provides liquidity to chapter 11 debtors. This fact alone suggests that
chapter 14 can never be a complete solution for financial distress
involving these large financial institutions. Instead, the Bankruptcy Code
and OLA should be amended so that they will work hand in hand. We
therefore strongly oppose proposals to repeal OLA and replace it with
chapter 14.
CONCLUSION
SPOE, TLAC, and chapter 14 are all designed to accomplish DoddFrank’s stated goal of ending the “too big to fail” problem. The process
of implementing Dodd-Frank has undoubtedly improved the ability of
financial regulators to respond to the collapse of a large financial
institution. However, as this Article has shown, significant doubts remain
about the ability of a major financial company to fail without imposing
substantial losses on taxpayers. Accordingly, it is far too soon to conclude
that Dodd-Frank has eliminated the risk of future bailouts of SIFIs.
219. See 11 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012).
220. Lubben would of course argue (and Wilmarth agrees) that, rather than create an
“exception to the exception,” the safe harbors should be reconsidered wholesale. E.g., Stephen J.
Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 123, 123 (2010);
Stephen J. Lubben, Transaction Simplicity, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 194, 196 (2012); see
also Adam J. Levitin, Prioritization and Mutualization: Clearinghouses and the Redundancy of
the Bankruptcy Safe Harbors, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 129, 130 (2015).
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We write this Article at a time of great uncertainty. Shortly after his
inauguration in January 2017, President Donald Trump announced that
he intended to “[do] a big number on Dodd-Frank” and expected “to be
cutting a lot out of Dodd-Frank.”221 When this Article went to press
shortly thereafter, it was unclear what parts of Dodd-Frank the President
actually intended to repeal or amend.222 One proposal—supported by
Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), the current chair of the House Financial
Services Committee—sought to repeal OLA and replace it with one of
the “chapter 14” proposals described in this Article.223 As we have
explained, that approach provides a “solution” for SIFI failures that is
more pretend than real. Only time will tell how current efforts to change
Dodd-Frank play out.

221. Ben Bain & Jesse Hamilton, Regulatory Reform: Trump Pledges ‘Big Number’ on
Dodd-Frank in Anti-Rule Push, 108 Banking Rep. (BNA) 202, 108 BBR 202 (BNA) (Feb. 6,
2017); Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Vows Cuts in Wall St. Rules from Obama
Era, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2017, at A9.
222. Victoria Finkle, Dodd-Frank: Banks Less Keen Than GOP for Sweeping Dodd-Frank
Overhaul, 108 Banking Rep. (BNA) 242, 108 BBR 242 (BNA) (Feb. 13, 2017); Robert Schmidt
et al., Dodd-Frank: Dodd-Frank’s Tentacles Go Deep—Won’t Be Cut Fast or Easily, 108
Banking Rep. (BNA) 250, 108 BBR 250 (BNA) (Feb. 13, 2017).
223. Jeff Bater, Systemic Risk: Yellen at Odds with GOP on Resolving Failing Banks, 108
Banking Rep. (BNA) 286, 108 BBR 286 (BNA) (Feb. 20, 2017) (reporting on testimony before
the House committee by Fed Chair Janet Yellen, in which she disagreed with Rep. Hensarling’s
proposal to repeal OLA).

